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 Abstract— Investigating network covert channels in 
smartphones has become increasingly important as smartphones 
have recently replaced the role of traditional computers. 
Smartphones are subject to traditional computer network covert 
channel techniques. Smartphones also introduce new sets of covert 
channel techniques as they add more capabilities and multiple 
network connections. This work presents a new network covert 
channel in smartphones. The research studies the ability to leak 
information from the smartphones’ applications by reaching the 
cellular voice stream, and it examines the ability to employ the 
cellular voice channel to be a potential medium of information 
leakage through carrying modulated “speech-like” data covertly. 
To validate the theory, an Android software audio modem has 
been developed and it was able to leak data successfully through 
the cellular voice channel stream by carrying modulated data with 
a throughput of 13 bps with 0.018% BER. Moreover, Android 
security policies are investigated and broken in order to 
implement a user-mode rootkit that opens the voice channels by 
stealthily answering an incoming voice call. Multiple scenarios are 
conducted to verify the effectiveness of the proposed covert 
channel.  This study identifies a new potential smartphone covert 
channel, and discusses some security vulnerabilities in Android OS 
that allow the use of this channel demonstrating the need to set 
countermeasures against this kind of breach. 
 
Index Terms— Android security, cellular network security, 
covert channel, data exfiltration, rootkit.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Network covert channels represent a significant problem due 
to their security implications. Thus many research efforts have 
been focused on their identification, detection, and prevention.  
Covert channel identification is the process of discovering a 
shared resource that might be utilized for covert communication. 
This research contributes to the field by identifying a new 
network covert channel in smartphones.   
Smartphones are always connected to the cellular network; 
however, little effort has been directed at investigating potential 
security threats with its covert communication. Previously, the 
cellular voice channel had never been used to launch such 
attacks to the best of our knowledge. This service was designed 
to carry audio only. Thus cellular service providers have not 
applied any information security protection systems, such as 
firewalls or intrusion detection systems, to guard cellular voice 
channel traffic in the cellular network core. Thus these channels 
are a prime choice over which to attempt a covert channel.  
Theoretically, this channel could be employed in 
smartphones to conduct multiple covert malicious activities, 
such as sending commands, or even leaking information. As 
there are some past research that studied modulating data to be 
“speech-like” and transmitting it through a cellular voice 
channel using a GSM modem and a computer [1-3]. In addition 
to the fact that smartphone hardware designers introduced a new 
smartphone design that provides higher-quality audio and video 
performance and longer battery life [4-5], this research 
discovered that, the new design allows smartphone applications 
to reach the cellular voice stream.  Thus information in the 
application could be intentionally or unintentionally leaked, or 
malware could be spread through the cellular voice stream. This 
could be accomplished by implementing a simple audio modem 
that is able modulate date to be “speech-like” and access the 
cellular voice stream to inject information to smartphones’ 
cellular voice cannel.  
This covert channel could be accompanied with rootkit that 
alters phone services to hide the covert communication 
channels. To investigate the potential threats with this covert 
channel, Android security mechanisms were tested and it was 
demonstrated that it is possible to build an Android persistent 
user-mode rootkit to intercept Android telephony API calls to 
answer incoming calls without the user or the system’s 
knowledge. The developed modem along with the rootkit 
successfully leaked data from the smartphone’s application and 
through cellular voice channel stream by carrying modulated 
data with a throughput of 13 bps with 0.018% BER.  
 
I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The covert channel concept was first presented by Lampson 
in 1973 as a communication channel that was neither designed 
nor intended for carrying information. [6]. A covert channel 
utilizes mechanisms that are not intended for communication 
purposes, thereby violating the network’s security policy [7]. 
Three key conditions were introduced that help in the emergence 
of a covert channel: 1) a global shared resource between the 
sender and the receiver must be present, 2) the ability to alter the 
shared resource, and 3) a way to accomplish synchronization 
between the sender and the receiver [8]. The cellular voice 
channel has all three conditions, making it an ideal channel for 
implementing a covert channel.  Network covert channel field 
research currently focuses on exploiting weaknesses in common 
Internet protocols such as TCP/IP [9], HTTP [10], VoIP [11], & 
SSH [12] to embed  a covert communication. In the cellular 
network field, it has been demonstrated that high capacity covert 
channels in SMS can be embedded and used as a data exfiltration 
channel by composing the SMS in Protocol Description Unit 
(PDU) mode [13]. In [14] the authors introduced stenographic 
algorithms to hide data in the context of MMS to be used in on-
time password and key communication. Cellular voice channel 
in smartphones has never been attempted before to the best of 
our knowledge.  
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
A. Smartphone Architecture 
Smartphones consist of two main processors, the baseband 
processor (BP) and the application processor (AP). AP is 
responsible for the user interface and applications. BP has a 
Real-Time Operating System (RTOS), such as Nucleus and 
ThreadX, while AP is controlled by Smartphone OS such as 
Android. BP handles radio access to the cellular network, and 
provides communication protocols such as GSM, GPRS, 
UMTS, etc. AP is responsible for the user interface and 
applications. These two processors communicate through 
shared-memory or a dedicated serial channel. Cellular voice 
call routing and control are achieved typically by the BP only, 
whereas the AP handles all other multimedia functions. Thus, 
end users and applications are not able to access the cellular 
voice stream. However, as users spend more time using mobile 
phones for more media-rich applications, most smartphone 
hardware designers wanted to provide higher-quality audio and 
video performance and longer battery life. Therefore, they first 
introduced a separate dedicated processor for audio/video 
decoding to meet these increasing needs [4]. Then, hardware 
designers merged the audio digital signal processor (DSP) into 
the AP [5]. 
As has been discovered in this research, this new design has 
resulted in the audio routing functionalities, including cellular 
voice calling, being controlled by the AP (Figure 1) adapted 
from [4]. This feature introduced a new security vulnerability. 
The audio path to the cellular voice channel could be reached 
and controlled from the AP and potentially the end user.  
 
 
 
 
B. Cellular Voice traffic Overview 
In digital cellular systems, like GSM and CDMA, when 
someone makes a phone call, the voice first passes to the 
microphone. It would then pass through the analog-to-digital 
converter (ADC) that converts the analog stream into digital 
data using Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) to be understood by 
the cell phone. The PCM method is utilized to represent 
sampled analog signals in digital form by recording a binary 
representation of the magnitude of the audio sample, and then 
the sample is encoded as an integer. The data stream then is 
processed and transmitted through the cellular core network in 
digital form.  
The audio data stream, traveling among the cellular channels, 
is compressed to allow greater channel capacity. The cellular 
channels are band-limited channels, so audio signals should 
have frequencies within the telephone voice band which is 
between 300 and 3400 Hz. In order to reduce the bandwidth of 
the voice call and save the power of the cellphone, 
Discontinuous Transmission (DTX) is used to allow the cell 
phone transmitter to be turned off when the user is not talking. 
To do so and detect silence, DTX uses Voice Activity Detection 
(VAD) which is a unit that determines whether the speech frame 
includes speech or a speech pause to reduce the transmission to 
only speech and to reject noise and silence. Once the frame has 
been labeled as non-speech, it is dismissed instead of being 
transmitted. When the data stream is received on the other side, 
it is restored to the original source signal format and the digital–
to-analog (DAC) module converts the bit stream back to audio 
wave. 
 
C.  Android OS Overview 
Android is an open source operating system based on 
the Linux kernel. The Android operating system consists of five 
software components within four main layers: Linux kernel, 
libraries, Android runtime, application framework, and 
applications (Figure 2). The first layer is the Linux kernel layer 
that provides main system functionalities, such as networking 
and device driver management as it communicates with the 
hardware and the BP. 
The second layer includes two components: a set of libraries 
to provide multiple system services, such playing and recording 
audio and video, and an Android Runtime environment which 
has a main component, Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM). DVM 
allows every Android application to run in its own process 
under a unique UNIX UID, and it is responsible for executing 
binaries of all applications located in the application layer. The 
third layer is the application framework that offers Application 
Programming Interfaces (API) to third party application 
developers.  The fourth layer is the applications layer that is 
written fully in Java, and represents the installed user 
application. Applications are written in Java and compiled to 
the Dalvik Executable (DEX) byte-code format.  Every 
application executes within its own instance of DVM 
interpreter. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1    Cirrus Logic Audio Subsystem Architecture show 
that the DSP, adapted from [4] 
Figure 2   Android Architecture Layer 
D. Android Telephony Framework 
Android telephony stack is responsible for the 
communication between BP and AP. Android telephony stack 
consists of four main layers:  applications, framework, radio 
interface layer, and BP (Figure 3).  The application layer 
involves all the smartphone telephony applications, such as 
Dialer, SMS, etc. Phone applications in the application layer 
communicate directly with the internal API in the telephony 
framework to place and tear down phone calls. Android 
telephony framework provides APIs for the phone application; 
however, APIs cannot be entered from any other applications 
that are not part of the Android system. The telephony requests 
are passed to the BP. BP replies to the application through the 
Telephony framework.   
The communications between the telephony framework and 
the BP are handled by the Radio Interface Layer (RIL).  The 
RIL communicates with the BP by utilizing a single serial line. 
RIL has two main components: a RIL Daemon and a Vendor 
RIL. The RIL Daemon connects the telephony framework to the 
Vendor RIL, initiates the modem, and reads the system 
properties to locate the proper library for the Vendor RIL. The 
Vendor RIL is the BP driver. There are various vendors, 
therefore, each vendor has a different implementation of the 
vendor RIL.   
 
  
Figure 3 Android Telephony Architecture 
E. Android Media Framework 
Since it is important to understand how smartphone cellular 
voice calls take place, it is essential to comprehend how 
Android handles audio streams which forms an important part 
in carrying out a cellular voice call.  Android Application 
Framework takes care of Android’s multimedia system; it uses 
the Android media APIs to call media native code to contact the 
audio hardware (Figure 4). The Android audio libraries include 
two native layers dealing with audio software: Audio Flinger 
and Audio Hardware Interface (HAL). 
Audio Flinger communicates with the HAL layer which 
represents the hardware abstraction layer that hides audio 
drivers from the Android platform. Audio Flinger is the audio 
server that provides some required audio functions, such as 
audio stream routing and mixing, since the audio stream can be 
either input or output to/from multiple microphones, speakers, 
and applications. Audio Flinger performs audio routing by 
setting a routing mode, such as MODE_IN_CALL, 
MODE_IN_COMMUNICATION, or MODE_NORMAL, 
which is then passed into audio.h interface in Audio HAL 
which, in turn, determines the routing path. 
When some applications use Audio Flinger to redirect the 
audio stream as STREAM_VOICE_CALL, some vendor-
specific audio HAL implementations redirect the stream that 
comes from/to an application from/to the actual stream voice 
call by default. In other smartphones, redirecting voice call 
stream from/to an application from/to the actual cellular voice 
stream is also possible, since the audio routing is currently 
accomplished using the application processor, not the BP as 
mentioned earlier.  This is achieved by making some 
modifications to audio HAL and some application framework 
components, such as Audio Service and Audio System in 
smartphones that cannot redirect the required audio path by 
default. 
 
Figure 4 Android Audio System 
F. Android Phone Calls 
In Android, phone calls are achieved using both the 
telephony and media frameworks. The phone application runs 
inside the com.android.phone process, which is comprised of 
multiple components such as SIP, SMS, and phone application. 
All of these components utilize the telephony framework APIs 
to communicate to the BP through an RIL socket. Hence, the 
phone application communicates to the BP by calling the 
framework APIs to initiate and receive voice calls.  When an 
incoming call reaches the destination cell phone, BP sends a 
request to RIL, which communicates to the phone application 
as a ringing call. Once the user answers the call, the phone 
application sends a message to the RIL to open the voice 
channel, and the Android media system switches on the voice 
call channel. 
 
G. Android Security 
Android framework involves multiple security mechanisms, 
such as application sandboxing, application signing, and 
Android permission framework. The application sandboxing 
mechanism is employed to isolate an application from system 
resources, actual hardware, and from the other application 
resources. Sandboxing is performed by assigning a unique user 
ID to each application to ensure that it has its own sandboxed 
execution environment.  Application signing is a key security 
mechanism in Android. All Android applications must be 
signed independently with a self-created key using public key 
infrastructure. Applications that are signed with the same key 
could share the same UID and play in the same sandbox.  
 The Android permission framework is utilized to control 
access to sensitive system resources by applying Mandatory 
Access Control (MAC) on Inter Component Communication 
(ICC). Therefore, each application defines a list of permissions 
that are approved during the installation process. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
H. Audio Modem Design   
The modem design consists of an encoder and decoder pair 
which works entirely in software. The encoder converts raw 
data into “speech-like” waveforms to be injected into the 
microphone of the downlink voice stream. The audio signals 
then travel among the cellular voice channel as speech in digital 
form, and reach the second cell phone to be played over uplink 
voice stream’s speaker. They are then demodulated and 
converted back into the original data.  The designed modem 
utilizes Morse code combined with Frequency Shift-Keying 
modulation (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5 Audio Modem Design 
I. The Encoder 
The encoder encodes text information into Morse code as a 
series of dots and dashes. Then it generates pure sine waves of 
two frequencies using FSK modulation: one frequency 
represents a dot and a different frequency represents a dash 
using the following equation for each sample in the buffer: 
 
𝑓(𝑥)  =  𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 ∗   𝑠𝑖𝑛(2𝜋𝑓) ∗ ( 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 /
 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)   (1) 
 
Where: 
 Amplitude: the amplitude of the wave. It is a constant value 
for all waves. 
 f: the frequency of the wave. This is a variable and it 
depends on if the current code is a dot or a dash. 
 Sample: the current sample in the buffer. 
 SampleRate: the modem sampling rate which is 8000 KHz. 
 Sample / sampleRate: represents the current time. 
 
 
The audio modem works as following: 
1) Map each character to its corresponding Morse code. 
2) Play a hail tone to indicate the beginning of the audio data. 
3) For every code: 
 Play a tone with high frequency if the code is a dash. 
 Play a tone with low frequency if the code is a dot. 
4) Play a silence to separate each character. 
5) Play a long silence to separate each word. 
6) Form each code to be a “speech-like” waveform of 200 ms 
frame length. 
The frequencies that were chosen with the modem are 600 
and 1000 to satisfy the demands of the cellular network voice 
channel bandwidth (300Hz and 3400Hz). In addition, the 
sampling rate was selected to be 8000 kHz to suit the telephony 
system sampling rate that carries speech signals. Each 200 ms 
voice frame is injected into the GSM encoder to avoid the 
distortion that could be issued from the VAD. 
J. The Decoder 
The decoder does the reverse function of the encoder. The 
decoder performs spectral analysis to analyze each received 
sample and estimates its frequency to retrieve the original data. 
Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) algorithm was used to analyze 
the spectrum and detect the frequency pitch. Therefore, when 
the decoder receives an audio wave sample, the following steps 
are accomplished: 
1) Low-pass filter is applied to the audio signal to get rid of 
noise and enhance the reliability of the pitch detection.  
2) Hann window function is applied to the input data to 
increase detection quality by examining the important 
details of the signal rather than analyzing the entire signal, 
and to avoid signal leakage in both sides of the wave. 
3) FFT is performed on the input data, which is an algorithm 
that quickly computes the frequency of a given signal.  The 
output of the FFT is an array of N complex numbers that 
has real and imaginary parts. 
4) Normalize the FFT bins to bring the peak amplitude to a 
normal level, and hence making all the received audio 
signal the same volume so as not to affect the quality of 
frequency detection.  
5) Calculate the magnitude values of each FFT bin, using the 
following formula: 
 
 𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒[𝑖] =  𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑡( 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙[𝑖] ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙[𝑖] +  𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔[𝑖] ∗
 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔 [𝑖])  (2) 
 
6) Get the bin of the maximum magnitude value in the FFT 
data. 
7) Calculate the frequency of the index of the maximum 
magnitude value to detect the signal frequency. The 
frequency is calculated by this equation:           
 
    𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞 =  𝑖 ∗  𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 / 𝑁 (3) 
 
Where: 
 i = index of magnitude 
 SampleRate =  the modem sampling rate  
 N = size of  FFT data 
 
8) Finally compare the received frequency to the dot and dash 
frequencies value with a minor tolerance. 
 
K. Modem Design Constraints and Challenges 
To develop a modem that copes with cellular network 
channel characteristics, some constraints on audio signal 
needed to be taken into consideration. 
1) The generated audio frequencies must fit into bandwidth 
between 300Hz and 3400Hz. Otherwise, an ultrasonic 
signal is generated that can’t be heard by the human ear and 
is not suitable for this channel. 
2) The generated audio signals should pass through the voice 
channel without being omitted by VAD which is primarily 
used to stop frame transmission at silence.  
3) Cellular networks employ speech compression codeces in 
order to save bandwidth and enhance sound quality. As a 
result, these speech compression techniques could 
significantly distort audio signals that are not “speech-
like”, so the generated signal must retain typical speech 
characteristics. 
In addition to the constraints mentioned above, there are a 
number of challenges in implementing such a modem. One of 
the challenges of the cellular voice channel is that a voice call 
between two cell phones is achieved in real time. Hence, there 
are no retransmissions in case of a missing voice frame. 
Sometimes, a voice frame could not be received by the other 
cell phone due to radio interference or the voice frame could be 
dropped intentionally by the core network when frame stealing 
scenario happens. Frame stealing usually happens during calls 
where a user receives an incoming waiting call request and the 
network drops the current voice frame in the conversation to 
send a notification to the user. On the other hand, smartphone 
capabilities, such as the processor and battery life, as well as the 
quality of audio hardware varies among cell phones; for 
example one cell phone speaker that sounds clear and loud 
could be low or unclear in another, as there are no 
standardizations in cell phone speaker and microphone 
specifications. 
  
L. Audio Modem Implementation 
The modem works as follows: When there is an ongoing 
cellular voice call, the receiver presses on the receive button to 
obtain the required data. At the sender side, a text message is 
encoded into Morse code, then an Integer array containing the 
dots and dash frequencies is composed. This array is sent to the 
encoder, sampled as sine waves to generate audio tones and 
injected into the cellular voice stream using 
AudioManager.STREAM_VOICE_CALL audio track stream.  
At the other end, after Receive button was pressed, it 
constantly records the uplink call stream to detect the hail key 
which refers to the beginning of the real incoming audio data. 
The hail key has a different frequency from the dots and dashes. 
It is generated once at the encoder to indicate the beginning of 
the audio data to be recorded. If the key was found, the Decoder 
decodes the audio waves using FFT algorithm and other signal 
processing functions to process the incoming signals and detect 
the frequencies. Once the audio signal frequencies have been 
determined, the decoder creates an Integer array of the detected 
frequencies which is then sent to the Morse decoder to retrieve 
the original data. 
  
M. Rootkit Design   
Besides an audio modem, it was necessary to employ another 
system that compromises smartphone operating systems and 
open cellular voice channels by stealthily answering voice calls 
and performing data exchange. This was accomplished by 
utilizing a rootkit that hides its presence in the operating system 
and quietly allows continuous privileged access. 
N. Bypassing Android Security Mechanisms 
To help the rootkit to catch the incoming calls before being 
delivered to Phone app, it was necessary to find a way to allow 
the rootkit to reach the RIL socket to listen to the BP messages. 
RIL socket is a Linux socket that is owned by 
com.android.phone process only, and it cannot be entered from 
outside the phone process. Thus, building the rootkit inside the 
com.android.phone process to communicate to the socket was 
the selected method to secretly communicate to the BP and to 
intercept its messages.  
Designing a rootkit to work inside the Phone process requires 
overcoming the Android application sandboxing mechanism.  
Sandboxing is achieved by assigning a unique User ID for each 
application so the other applications cannot access its data and 
resources unless they have shared User ID, process, and their 
certificate match.  The rootkit takes advantages of 
“android:sharedUserId” and “android:process” attributes in the 
manifest to play inside the com.android.phone process sandbox.  
The android:sharedUserId attribute allows two applications to 
share the same User ID so it can reach the other’s application 
data and resources. The android:process sets the process where 
all the application’s components should run.  
Setting sharedUserId and process attributes on the manifest 
allows the rootkit to run in the com.android.phone process; 
however, it also requires the rootkit’s certificate to match the 
Phone App’s certificate unless the signature verification 
process in Android is bypassed during the installation time. 
 The Phone App application is signed by the system platform 
certificate and runs in the shared system sandbox as a system 
user. Therefore, it has more privileges to access the system 
resources. Signing the rootkit with the platform signature was 
obtained with custom ROMs, such as Cyanogenmod, because 
they are using the default certificate which is known as it is 
released publically.  
Another method also used in this research is bypassing the 
signature verification method in order to infect the rooted 
Android official ROMs. That was achieved by modifying the 
Services.jar. The Services.jar has multiple java classes. One of 
these classes is PackageManagerService class responsible for 
matching the signature of the application during the installation 
time. The method in the PackageManagerService is called 
CompareSignatures, a Boolean method that returns true if the 
signature match and false if not. The method was modified to 
always return true which means the signature is always 
matched. This approach could be used by an attacker with any 
rooted Android easily. 
After overcoming the security obstacles, the rootkit was 
successfully constructed inside the phone process. Yet it needs 
to go further to intercept the telephony framework APIs calls 
and take control of answering the incoming voice calls. To 
discover a process to intercept the telephony APIs calls and 
control the system call flow, it was necessary to understand how 
telephony applications really work to understand their 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities. However, as there is no 
documentation about the telephony applications, it was 
essential to analyze the phone app and the internal telephony 
framework source code. Therefore, in the following section a 
discussion about Android application architecture and the 
Phone App incoming call data flow are provided in order to 
discover any vulnerability that helps in achieve the task. 
 
O. Android Application Architecture 
In this section, an overview of how an Android application 
generally works is highlighted. When an Android application is 
not running, and one of its components starts, the Android 
system initiates a new Linux process with a single main thread 
of execution for the application. Then, when another 
component of the same application also starts, it will run in the 
same process and the same main thread.  
The main thread is essential because all the application’s 
components will run in it by default. The main thread is 
responsible for user interface interactions and events handling. 
It also handles system calls to each application component. 
Android thread can associate with a Looper which runs a 
message loop for a thread to process different messages.  A 
Looper contains a MessageQueue that contains a list of 
messages.  The interaction with the message queue is performed 
by using a Handler class (Figure 6). 
The Handler is associated to the Looper and its associated 
thread. Handler is responsible for handling messages within the 
MessageQueue. When a message is delivered to a Handler, a 
new message arrives in the MessageQueue.   When a thread 
creates a new Handler, it binds the Handler to it and to its 
message queue. Then the Handler can send messages to the 
message queue and handle messages as they arrive from the 
message queue.  
 
 
 
Figure 6 Thread’s Looper and Handler 
 
P. Incoming Call Data flow 
When an incoming call request arrives to the BP, it is 
delivered to the Vendor RIL. The Vendor RIL passes the 
request to the RIL daemon which delivers the request to the 
telephony framework layer. The request message is passed 
among the telephony framework classes in this order: RIL, 
Basecommand, GSMCallTracker, GSMPhone, BasePhone and 
then CallManager. The CallManager communicates to the 
Phone App in the application layer of Android to show up as an 
incoming call (Figure 7).  
Each class in the telephony framework can obtain 
notifications about the arriving messages by using 
RegistrantList object, which is simply an object that holds a 
Java ArrayList of Registrants object. So each class registers 
itself with the previous class’s list in order to obtain 
notifications.  The rootkit takes advantage of this design and 
registers itself with PhoneBase and receiveds the incoming 
notifications when they are delivered to the CallManager, and 
acts before CallManager Handler passes the incoming 
notification to the Phone App. Once the rootkit has received the 
incoming notification about a new incoming call, it obtains the 
incoming call’s caller ID and compares it with a predefined 
number. If the number does not match, it leaves the notification 
to arrive at its final destination, which is the Phone App that 
shows up as an incoming call. However, if the caller ID matches 
the predefined number, it answers the call covertly.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Android threads can only perform one task at a time. If a long 
running task has been executed in the Handler, the message 
queue cannot handle and process any other messages. In 
Figure 7 An Incoming Voice Call Request Flow between 
the BP and AP in Android 
addition, it was discovered during this research that it is 
possible to conduct denial of service to the Looper, so the other 
process components could not receive new arriving messages. 
Android Looper is based on c code in native libraries. When 
trying to Send Message at Front of Queue twice manipulating 
the pointers, the message queue will be starved and the Looper 
hindered. This blocks the thread from delivering the new 
messages causing denial of service (DOS), or, in another 
scenario, changing the program flow in order to execute 
malicious code. Therefore, the message queue has been starved 
by sending two messages at the front of the message queue to 
hinder the Looper and blocks the thread from delivering the new 
messages. Thus, when the rootkit wants to answer the call 
covertly, it hinders the Looper from delivering the other 
messages until finishing the call. The Looper in the phone’s 
main thread will not be able to deliver the other messages to the 
phone application. The rootkit acts as a proxy between the 
application layer and the telephony framework to transparently 
intercept and filter incoming voice calls from the BP (Figure 8). 
Whenever an incoming voice call request comes from the BP to 
the Phone App, the rootkit intercepts that incoming call request 
and decides whether to answer the call covertly in the case of 
calls from a specified number or to pass the call request to the 
Phone App to show the incoming call. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q. The Rootkit Implementation   
The rootkit was implemented as an Android service that 
should be installed in the system partition of the application 
layer as it needs a privileged access.  The rootkit works as 
follows: the rootkit service starts with the system boot and 
works as a persistent service, so when it is killed by the system 
due to shortage of the system resources, it restarts. When the 
service runs, it works inside the phone process and the phone 
process’s main thread. The service creates a Handler and hooks 
itself and its Handler to the main Looper of the main thread in 
phone processes. Once the Handler has been created, it is able 
to obtain and send messages from/to the phone main thread’s 
message queue. 
When the Handler starts, it registers itself with the 
PhoneBase’s Registrant List to listen to messages that come 
from the Phone Base object and to receive notifications before 
CallManager. When the Handler receives a new ringing 
connection message that comes from the Phone Base, it gets the 
caller ID and compares it with a predefined number. If the caller 
ID does not match, it leaves the message to arrive at its 
destination. If it matches, it answers the call before the Phone 
App has been notified and hinders the main Looper by starving 
its message queue. The Handler sends two messages to the front 
of the message queue hindering the main Looper. 
In fact, while implementing the rootkit, it was essential to use 
the Android telephony internal classes and hidden components. 
However, as it is stated in Android documentation, these 
internal and hidden API telephony classes could not be reached 
by applications other than the phone process.  This rule was 
simply achieved by excluding the jar files of the internal classes 
and the hidden APIs from the developer environment, such as 
Android Studio and Eclipse environments, and no extra steps 
were necessary to prevent using these APIs at the run time. The 
solution was simply to include these jar files in the developing 
environments in order to be able to use them. 
 
R. Rootkit Situations 
The rootkit makes decisions based on the current situation of 
the phone call state as follows: 
1) When a hacker calls during a call between the victim and 
another party, the rootkit will answer the hacker’s call 
without being noticed by the victim. 
2) When a hacker calls during an idle phone state, the rootkit 
will answer the call covertly and allow data exchange and 
spying. 
3) When a victim tries to initiate an outgoing call during a 
hang-up call, or when a victim receives an incoming call 
request during a hang-up call by the hacker; the phone app 
will not respond to the request and will be idle because its 
main loop has been starved by a denial of service attack 
that was accomplished by the rootkit. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND RESULTS 
Using a real cellular infrastructure is more reliable than a 
simulated network; therefore, a real cellular network 
infrastructure and real smartphone were used during the 
experience to validate the theory. The T-Mobile GSM network 
was selected to conduct the experiment. The developed systems 
in this research could be run in all Android phones. However, 
in some Android devices, there is a need to modify some 
Android system audio files in order to control the voice call 
stream. The smartphones used in this experiment are Samsung 
Galaxy S3 and Galaxy Nexus. These two phones were chosen 
because of their ability to control the voice call stream by 
default; thus no extra work was needed to modify some system 
audio files to control the stream. The voice call was only used 
for the experiments. Both smartphones run Android Jelly Bean 
4.3.3. Galaxy Nexus runs Cyanogenmod custom ROMs, and 
Samsung Galaxy S3 runs a rooted official ROM.  
(a) Rootkit Location in Android Telephony Framework (b) Rootkit Data flow  
Figure 8 Rootkit Location and Control Flow on Android’s Telephony 
S. First Scenario 
The first scenario was implemented to investigate the ability 
to utilize the cellular network as a bidirectional covert channel. 
In this scenario, two individuals exchange text messages using 
a smartphone application and the cellular voice channel as a 
shared resource. In this scenario, only the audio modem was 
used and combined with a user interface to help the two 
individuals send and receive the messages. The application 
resides in the application layer. Thus, any kind of information 
could be leaked intentionally from the sender to the receiver. 
Test Results: Figure 9 displays a screenshot of the smartphones 
to exhibit test results that were conducted during an active voice 
call. This successfully validates the modem’s ability to utilize 
the cellular voice channel as a carrier of the generated audio 
signals by the smartphone. However, sometimes the receiver 
could not get the exact original data for several reasons, such as 
noisy environment, frame stealing scenario, smartphone audio 
hardware quality, and modem implementation.  
 
 
 
T. Second Scenario 
The second scenario examines the ability to use the proposed 
covert channel to leak information unintentionally from one 
side while the other side desires a successful communication. 
In this scenario, rootkit works in the hacked smartphone and 
monitors and filters the incoming calls. Once rootkit has 
received an incoming voice call from a predefined number, it 
opens the voice channel covertly before it shows up in the 
smartphone’s Phone App to allow data exchange. In this 
scenario, when the channel is opened, the last SMS in the 
hacked smartphone will be modulated and sent over the covert 
channel to be acquired by the other side. The other side uses the 
software audio modem application to modulate the audio waves 
and see the last SMS. In addition, theoretically any kind of data 
could be leaked, such as a picture or video; however, this 
implementation focuses on text data and was used only to 
validate the proposed covert channel.  
Test Results:  Figure 10 displays a screenshot of the 
smartphones to show test results. When the attacker made a call 
to the victim, rootkit recognized the attacker caller ID and, 
based on that fact, answered the call without showing up on the 
victim’s screen. The victim had no idea about the ongoing voice 
call in his smartphone. Rootkit leaked the last received SMS in 
the victim’s device by using the software audio modem. The 
attacker obtained the SMS by using the developed audio 
modem. However, the victim might hear audio waves played in 
his/her phone, but this issue can be overcome by using  
modulation techniques that simulate a natural sound like a bird 
or cricket, as these sounds could be played as a notification in 
some applications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U. Third Scenario 
The third scenario was implemented to test the proposed 
covert channel to be involved in botnets as command and 
control C2 channel. With any botnet, C2 channel is the most 
significant part that contributes into its covertness and 
effectiveness. The designed system is similar to the second 
scenario as it combines both the audio modem and rootkit. 
However, when the rootkit opens the incoming voice channel 
based on a decision made regarding the caller ID number, the 
rootkit listens to any command that is sent by the other side and 
executes it directly instead of leaking information from the 
hacked device. Rootkit will act as a botnet that listens to 
commands and executes them as required. Table 1 includes 
some of the offered commands in this scenario: 
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Test Results: Figure 11 includes screenshots of the 
smartphones to show test results. When the attacker made a call 
to the victim, rootkit recognized the attacker caller ID and, 
based on that, answered the call without showing up on the 
victim’s screen. Rootkit then waited to receive a command, and 
once it was obtained, executed it. The attacker sent the 
command using the developed audio modem.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Command Description 
Reboot Reboot the system. 
Clrlog Clear call log. 
Blueto Switch Bluetooth on. 
Table 1 Some Commands with the Implemented Bot 
Figure 9:     The screens show a sender and a receiver 
forming a covert channel to exchange information as audio 
through voice call. 
 
Figure 11 The right screen shows the hacker’s screen when 
he sent “Blueto” command to open the Bluetooth device in 
the hacked phone, the left screen shows the hacked phone 
when it respond to the command and turned on the 
Bluetooth device. 
Figure 10 The right screen shows when the attacker made a call to the victim, 
and in the left screen the rootkit in the hacked phone recognized the attacker’s 
caller ID and based on that it answered the call without showing up on the 
victim’s screen 
DISCUSSION 
V. Modem analysis 
In tested scenarios, when ideal conditions occurred where the 
surrounding environment is quiet, the smartphone hardware is 
loud and clear, air interface is not noisy, and the call is carried 
out over one speech compression technique. The results were 
perfect and accurate, as the second party got the exact sent 
message. In a realistic scenario, these conditions are not always 
guaranteed, so any conditions can easily either hinder the 
message from being transformed or omit some frames in the 
sent message. However, the audio modem design can be 
enhanced and optimized to overcome these constraints. The 
objective of the audio modem implementation is only to verify 
basic functionality and show possible scenarios that can be 
implemented successfully on real smartphones.  
The modem implementation works in most Android 
smartphones, but the ability to access the voice call stream 
varies among Android smartphones. Some smartphones can 
reach the voice stream from Audio Manager directly; however, 
reaching the voice stream of a cellular call in other smartphones 
could be accomplished by modifying some Android system 
files. The current modem implementation with the capability to 
reach the voice call stream by default works on most Samsung 
Galaxy S series and Nexus smartphones. 
 
W. Rootkit Analysis  
User-mode rootkit design has two primary purposes—
building a rootkit that is able to communicate to the BP and run 
covertly in any rooted Android OS, and filtering the incoming 
call to answer voice calls, if needed, before they show up on the 
Android screen. In addition, it was important to verify the 
ability to implement a portable rootkit that can work easily 
without modifying underlying system files or applications. In 
fact, the portability factor is significant to test the ability to 
deploy the rootkit in any smartphone device, which indicates 
the ease of its distribution among Android smartphones.  
Rootkit implementation successfully verified what it was 
meant to do. Rootkit was able to be portable and work silently. 
The rootkit works in all Android-rooted stock ROMs, as well as 
most custom ROMs that have Jelly Bean 4.3.3 version or below, 
and it was not tested in newer versions. Rootkit was tested 
successfully in Samsung Galaxy S 3 I9300, Galaxy Nexus and 
Nexus S, Samsung Galaxy S 4, and Samsung Galaxy Duos y 
GSM versions, and is believed to work in most GSM and 
CDMA Android smartphones.   
 
X. Covert channel analysis 
The effectiveness of a covert channel can be evaluated by 
three factors; covertness, bandwidth, and robustness. 
Covertness determines to what extent the covert channel can be 
detected. The proposed covert channel is difficult to be detected 
because it is unknown by an adversary. Channel bandwidth 
refers to the channel maximum error-free transmission rate. 
Bandwidth is usually expressed in bits per second.  
 
There are multiple factors effect on the cellular voice channel 
bandwidth. One factor is the used speech codec which affects 
the bit rate of the data. In addition, the speech codec can be 
switched during calls, because cellular network providers also 
can control and increase the number of active calls within one 
base station by switching cell phones to a low bitrate speech 
codec. That will impact the data transfer rate, as it could vary 
among the speech codecs and also in one speech codec at the 
time when the base station experiences an overload. In the 
proposed channel, the voice call throughput was entirely 
occupied in order to convey covert information, and it achieved 
a throughput of 13 bps with 0.018% BER. 
 
The channel robustness determines the ease of limiting the 
channel capacity by adding noise or the ease of removing the 
covert channel. Therefore, the channel robustness is high, 
because it is not reliable to remove or add noise to this kind of 
channel; it will affect the legitimate data transferring quality. 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
As smartphones are trending to increase their computational 
capabilities, employees and individuals increasingly rely on 
smartphones to perform their tasks, and as a result smartphone 
security becomes more significant than ever before. One of the 
most serious threats to information security, whether within 
organization or individual, is covert channels, because they 
could be employed to leak sensitive information, divert the 
ordinary use of a system, or coordinate attacks on a system. 
Therefore, identification of covert channels is considered an 
essential task. This research takes a step in this direction by 
identifying a potential covert channel which could affect 
smartphone security. It provides a proof of concept of the ability 
to use the cellular voice channel as a covert channel to leak 
information or distribute malware. It introduces details of 
designing and implementing the system and the challenges and 
constraints that have been faced to accomplish the system. It 
has been realized during this research that as smartphone 
hardware and software designs have changed recently, it 
allowed and contributed to the issue discussed in this research. 
This new smartphones’ design is adopted by multiple 
companies, and thus new smartphones are being released that 
use this design without considering the security vulnerability.   
 
This research also proves that communication between the AP 
and the BPs is vulnerable to attack in Android OS. In addition, 
it discusses some of the Android security mechanisms that were 
easily bypassed to accomplish the mission. The paper illustrates 
some discovered flaws in Android application architecture that 
allow a break in significant and critical Android operations. 
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